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Natural Law vs Legal Positivism in Jurisprudence

In this article
  1. Legal validity, moral merit and the duty to obey
  2. What Aquinas, Hart and Fuller actually argued
  3. One unjust rule and one secret rule
  4. Rina faces a public but discriminatory rule
  5. Yusuf receives a fine under an unpublished circular
  6. Where moral language enters an Indian constitutional case
  7. Keep three questions in view
  8. Sources
p>Natural law and legal positivism disagree about how law is connected to morality. Legal positivists explain what counts as law through social facts about a legal system's accepted sources and criteria. In Aquinas’s natural law account, reason and the common good help explain what gives human law its authority. Both approaches leave room to condemn an unjust enactment.

Legal validity, moral merit and the duty to obey

QuestionLegal positivismNatural law and related approaches
What identifies a law?Start with the criteria the legal system recognises, such as enactment by a competent legislature. A system may itself make moral standards part of those criteria.For Aquinas, human law derives its character as law from reason and its relation to natural law. Other approaches give different accounts of that connection.
What follows from serious injustice?A rule can satisfy the system's criteria and still be gravely unjust. Whether to obey or enforce it calls for further moral judgment.In Aquinas's account, serious injustice can undermine the moral obligation to obey, with qualifications. Fuller's argument focuses on conditions such as publicity and consistency that make governance through rules possible.

What Aquinas, Hart and Fuller actually argued

  1. Thomas Aquinas. In Summa Theologiae, I–II, questions 95 and 96, he connects human law to reason and asks whether unjust laws bind in conscience. He says an enactment unjust in relation to the human good may still be obeyed to avoid scandal or disturbance. He considers laws contrary to divine good impermissible to obey. His argument concerns the authority a rule can claim, even when officials can enforce it.
  2. H.L.A. Hart. In his 1958 essay, Hart defends the distinction between what law is and what it ought to be. A legal system's rules can be morally criticised, including when a rule satisfies the system's tests for legal validity. Keeping those questions distinct makes it possible to say plainly when enforcing a valid rule would be wrong.
  3. Lon L. Fuller. Fuller replies that law is a way of governing through rules. Promulgation, consistency and congruence between declared rules and official action matter to that enterprise. A critique about how officials make and apply rules differs from a claim that every unfair outcome strips a rule of legal status.

One unjust rule and one secret rule

Rina faces a public but discriminatory rule

Assume a legislature with unquestioned formal power passes and publishes a law barring people from a certain district from holding a trade licence. Rina loses her licence even though she has met every other qualification. In a system that recognises the legislature's enactment and imposes no applicable higher-law constraint, Hart's distinction lets us call the rule legally valid and condemn the injustice. An Aquinas-style analysis asks what public good the restriction can serve and whether it binds Rina in conscience. Fuller’s concerns about the form of rules would require a separate analysis of how the law was made and applied.

Yusuf receives a fine under an unpublished circular

Officials fine Yusuf for opening his shop after 7 p.m. They cite a circular the public had no way to read when he opened. A positivist would check whether the system gives that body power to impose fines and whether publication is a condition of validity. Fuller's account adds a question about legal authority: how could a rule guide Yusuf's conduct if he could not discover it beforehand? On those facts, both the source of the official’s authority and the effect of keeping the circular secret need examination.

Where moral language enters an Indian constitutional case

The Supreme Court's opinions in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1, invoke constitutional morality in assessing Section 377 IPC as applied to private, consensual sexual conduct between adults. That is an example of moral reasoning within the authority of a written Constitution. A positivist can explain why the Constitution supplies the legal standard and still debate the best reading of its rights. The case can be read alongside the Navtej Singh Johar case brief.

Keep three questions in view

Start by asking what makes the rule legally valid in the given system. Then ask whether it merits obedience and whether an official ought to enforce it. Identify precisely where Hart, Aquinas or Fuller changes the analysis. If a constitution gives judges an equality standard, apply that legal standard before reaching a conclusion about a statute's validity. For a judgment that relies on it, distinguish the binding rule from other observations using the ratio decidendi and obiter dicta guide.

Sources

Priya Pillai

About the author

Priya Pillai is the founder of LegalFly and has taught law for 9 years. She explains case law and legal concepts on the LegalFly YouTube channel.

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