The latest
Briefs & notes
Recent landmark case briefs and legal explainers across common-law jurisdictions.
Common Intention vs Common Object Under the BNS
Section 3(5) concerns a criminal act done in furtherance of a shared intention. Section 190 concerns an offence linked to the common object of an unlawful assembly.
Composite vs Contributory Negligence in India
Composite negligence concerns multiple wrongdoers causing the same injury to a claimant free from fault. Contributory negligence concerns the claimant's own share of fault.
Contingent Contract vs Wagering Agreement in Indian Law
A contingent contract makes performance depend on a collateral event. A wager makes the parties' gain or loss turn on the result in which they have only a stake.
Doctrine of Eclipse Under Article 13 of the Indian Constitution
An otherwise valid pre-Constitution law may be unenforceable to the extent it conflicts with a fundamental right. It can operate again if the constitutional conflict is removed.
Preparation vs Attempt Under Section 62 BNS
Preparation arranges the means to commit an offence. Attempt begins when the accused, with the required intent, does an act towards committing it.
Reasonable Apprehension of Bias in Indian Administrative Law
A reasonable apprehension of bias depends on the circumstances a decision-maker brings to the case. The affected person's suspicion needs an objective basis.
Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act and Non-Gratuitous Benefits
Section 70 may require compensation or restoration when someone voluntarily takes the benefit of lawful work or delivery that was never intended as a gift.
Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act on Damages for Breach
Section 73 compensates loss caused by breach that arises in the ordinary course or was known to be likely at contract formation. Avoidable and remote losses fall outside the award.
Theft vs Criminal Breach of Trust Under the BNS
Theft under Section 303 requires movement of movable property with dishonest intent to take it from another's possession without consent. Section 316 requires entrustment and dishonest misuse.
Writ of Quo Warranto in India Under Article 226
Quo warranto tests a person's legal entitlement to occupy a substantive public office. The court looks for a binding requirement the appointment violated.
Coercion vs Undue Influence Under the Indian Contract Act
Coercion under Section 15 concerns specified acts or threats that procure agreement. Undue influence under Section 16 concerns the use of a dominant position to gain an unfair advantage.
Communication of Acceptance Under Section 4 of the Indian Contract Act
Section 4 uses two moments for a properly posted acceptance. Communication is complete against the proposer on dispatch and against the acceptor when it comes to the proposer’s knowledge. The method of communication can change the analysis.
Compounding a Cheque Bounce Case Under Section 147
Section 147 allows parties to settle a Section 138 cheque dishonour prosecution through compounding. The stage of the case affects the additional cost.
Doctrine of Manifest Arbitrariness Under Article 14
Article 14 permits courts to strike down legislation for manifest arbitrariness. The inquiry asks what justifies the rule and whether that justification can support its effects.
Doctrine of Repugnancy Under Article 254
Article 254 resolves conflicts between Union and State laws in the Concurrent field. Presidential assent can change which law prevails in the State.
Medical Negligence in India: Duty, Breach and Causation
A civil medical negligence claim requires a duty of care, a departure from reasonable professional standards and harm caused by that departure.
Natural Law vs Legal Positivism in Jurisprudence
Legal positivism explains legal validity through a system’s recognised sources. Natural law theories ask how reason, justice or the rule of law shape legal authority.
Internal Committee vs Local Committee Under the POSH Act
The POSH Act directs complaints to the workplace Internal Committee or, in specified cases, the district Local Committee. The identity of the respondent can change the route.
Ratio Decidendi vs Obiter Dicta in Indian Law
The ratio decidendi is the legal principle that decides a case. Obiter dicta fall outside that reasoning. Indian courts can give particular weight to considered observations of the Supreme Court.
Writ of Mandamus in India Under Article 226
Mandamus can require an authority or body to perform a public duty owed to the applicant. The legal duty matters even where the respondent is privately managed.
Article 32 vs Article 226: Which Court Can Issue a Writ?
Article 32 guarantees access to the Supreme Court to enforce fundamental rights. Article 226 lets High Courts enforce those rights and grant writ relief for other legal rights.
Doctrine of Pith and Substance Under Article 246
Courts use pith and substance to identify what a law is really about. A law within a legislature's assigned field can survive an incidental effect on another field.
Doctrine of Severability Under Article 13
A court can preserve the valid parts of an unconstitutional law if the remainder can work on its own and the legislature would have enacted it separately.
Liquidated Damages and Penalties Under Section 74
Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act generally permits reasonable compensation for breach, capped at the sum named or penalty stipulated. The agreed figure is not automatically payable.
Offer vs Invitation to Offer Under Indian Contract Law
An offer can be accepted as it stands. An invitation to offer asks someone else to make a proposal, which the inviter can accept or reject.
Privity of Contract in India: Who Can Enforce a Promise?
A person outside a contract ordinarily cannot enforce it in India. The rule concerns who can sue. Consideration can come from someone other than the promisee.
Article 21A and the Right to Education in India
Article 21A guarantees free and compulsory education from ages six to fourteen. The RTE Act sets out what the right requires of governments and different kinds of schools.
Delegated Legislation in India: Powers, Limits and Examples
Delegated legislation lets an authority make binding rules under powers granted by an Act. The Act must set the policy, and the rule must stay within the authority the Act grants.
Principles of Natural Justice in Indian Administrative Law
A fair administrative decision ordinarily requires an impartial decision-maker and a meaningful opportunity to respond. The procedure depends on the statute and the decision's consequences.
Reasonable Restrictions on Free Speech Under Article 19(2)
Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions on speech only on listed grounds. The restriction must have a legal basis and a sufficiently close link to the ground invoked.
Right to Livelihood Under Article 21: What It Protects
Article 21 protects livelihood as part of the right to life. A public authority may still regulate the use of public space, but it must rely on law and follow fair procedure.
Right to Privacy in India: What Article 21 Protects
Privacy is a fundamental right in India. The Puttaswamy decisions explain what it protects and how to test whether a government intrusion can be justified.
When Does Extortion Become Robbery? BNS Section 309
Extortion becomes robbery when a nearby offender creates fear of instant death, hurt or wrongful restraint and thereby induces an immediate handover. Section 309 also defines a separate route through theft.
Writ of Certiorari in India: When a Court Can Quash an Order
Certiorari lets a High Court quash a tribunal's or similar adjudicatory decision for a qualifying legal defect. It does not let the High Court rehear the facts as an appeal court.
Article 356 and President’s Rule in India
Article 356 allows temporary Union intervention when a state government cannot function under the Constitution. Parliament and the courts limit how the power is used.
Article 20(3) and the Right Against Self-Incrimination in India
Article 20(3) protects an accused from compelled self-incriminating testimony. BNSS Section 180(2) separately protects people answering police questions.
Section 35 BNSS Notice and the Limits on Arrest
For cognizable offences punishable by up to seven years in prison, a notice to appear is the rule. Section 35(1)(b) requires police to justify any arrest.
The Basic Structure Doctrine in India
Parliament may amend the Constitution under Article 368. Courts can invalidate an amendment that damages or destroys a basic feature of the Constitution.
Consideration in Indian Contract Law
Section 2(d) covers acts, promises and forbearance at the promisor's request. Section 25 sets out when a promise can bind without consideration.
Frustration of Contract in India Under Section 56
Section 56 can discharge a contract after an event makes performance impossible or unlawful. Start with the contract's allocation of the risk.
Habeas Corpus in India Under Articles 32 and 226
A habeas corpus petition asks a court to examine the legal basis for someone's custody and order release if that custody is unlawful.
Reasonable Classification Under Article 14: Worked Examples
A classification must draw an intelligible distinction between groups and connect that distinction to the law's purpose. See how to apply both requirements.
Strict vs. Absolute Liability in Indian Tort Law
Compare the strict liability rule in Rylands v. Fletcher with India's absolute liability rule for hazardous enterprises. See when escape matters, which defences apply, and how to work through an exam problem.
Adverse Possession: Elements, Time Periods and Examples
Adverse possession lets someone who openly occupies another person's land, without permission, for the full statutory period become its owner. Here are the elements, state time periods, tacking, color of title, how squatters differ, and what to do in a boundary dispute.
Libel vs. Slander: The Difference, Elements and Defenses
Libel and slander are both defamation: a false statement of fact that harms someone's reputation. Libel is written or otherwise fixed, slander is spoken. Here are the elements, defamation per se, actual malice for public figures, the main defenses, and online posts.
Respondeat Superior: When Employers Are Liable for Employees
Respondeat superior makes an employer liable for torts its employees commit within the scope of employment, even if the employer did nothing wrong. Here is the test, frolic and detour, intentional torts, independent contractors, and how England and India apply vicarious liability.
Statute of Frauds: Which Contracts Must Be in Writing
The statute of frauds requires certain contracts to be in writing and signed by the person being held to them, including land sales, contracts that cannot be performed within a year, promises to pay another's debt, and sales of goods of $500 or more. Here are the categories, what counts as a writing, and the exceptions.
Stare Decisis: What It Means and How Precedent Works
Stare decisis ("to stand by things decided") is the principle that courts follow earlier decisions on the same legal question. Here is how binding and persuasive precedent work, what counts as the holding, when courts overrule, and how England and India apply it.
Mens Rea and Actus Reus: The Two Elements of a Crime
Most crimes need two things: actus reus, a voluntary act or omission, and mens rea, a guilty mind, present at the same time. Here are the Model Penal Code's four mental states, the voluntary act rule, strict liability, and the cases that shape them.
The Parol Evidence Rule: Integration, Exceptions, Cases and Examples
The parol evidence rule stops a party from using earlier or same-time oral or written agreements to contradict, and sometimes to add to, a final written contract. Here is how integration works, the exceptions, the leading cases, and UCC 2-202.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED): Elements and Cases
Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) lets a person recover for severe emotional distress caused intentionally or recklessly by extreme and outrageous conduct. Here are the four elements, what counts as outrageous, the First Amendment limits, and how negligent infliction (NIED) differs.
False Imprisonment: Elements, Examples, and the Shopkeeper's Privilege
False imprisonment is intentionally confining someone within fixed boundaries without consent or legal justification. Here are the elements, the shopkeeper's privilege, the leading cases, how the crime differs from the tort, and what to do if it happened to you.
Negligence Per Se: Elements, Excuses, Cases and Examples
Negligence per se treats a defendant's unexcused violation of a safety statute as negligence, if the statute was meant to protect people like the plaintiff from that kind of harm. Here are the elements, the excuses, the leading cases, and how states differ.
How to Brief a Case: A Step-by-Step Guide With a Worked Example
A case brief is a one-page summary of a court opinion: the facts, procedural history, issue, holding, reasoning and rule. Here is how to write each part, a complete worked brief of Lucy v. Zehmer, and the mistakes that make briefs useless in class.
Comparative vs. Contributory Negligence: How Fault Affects Recovery
Under contributory negligence, an injured person who was even slightly at fault recovers nothing. Under comparative negligence, their damages are reduced by their share of the fault. Here is how pure and modified comparative negligence work, which jurisdictions still use contributory negligence, and worked examples.
Assault vs. Battery: The Difference in Tort and Criminal Law
Assault is causing someone to expect an imminent harmful or offensive touching; battery is the touching itself. Here is how the two differ in tort law and criminal law, the leading cases, and what to do if it happened to you.
Res Ipsa Loquitur: Meaning, Elements, Cases and Examples
Res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself") lets a jury infer negligence when an accident would not ordinarily happen without someone's carelessness and the defendant is the one responsible. Here are the elements, the leading cases, and how it works in court and on exams.
Promissory Estoppel: Elements, Section 90, Cases and Exam Tips
Promissory estoppel makes a promise enforceable without consideration when the promisee reasonably relied on it and injustice can be avoided only by enforcing it. Here are the elements under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90, the leading cases, and how it is tested.
Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006)
(2006) 8 SCC 1
In 2006, the Supreme Court issued seven binding directives to all states compelling structural police reforms, including State Security Commissions, fixed tenures for the DGP and field officers, separation of investigation from law-and-order functions, Police Establishment Boards, Police Complaints Authorities, and a National Security Commission.
Case Summary: D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal
AIR 1997 SC 610
Acting on a letter treated as a PIL, the Supreme Court (Kuldip Singh and A.S. Anand JJ., 18 Dec 1996) laid down 11 mandatory guidelines to prevent custodial torture and deaths — including visible police identification, an attested arrest memo, the right to have a relative informed, and a medical examination every 48 hours — as requirements flowing from Articles 21 and 22. Breach attracts departmental action, contempt, and public-law compensation (building on Nilabati Behera). The guidelines were later codified into the CrPC (§§41B, 41C, 41D, 50A, 55A) and now continue under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992): Case Summary
(1992) 3 SCC 666
In Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1992 SC 1858), the Supreme Court held that the right to education flows from the right to life under Article 21, and that charging capitation fees is arbitrary and violates Articles 14 and 21. The sweeping ruling was narrowed a year later in Unni Krishnan (1993), which limited the fundamental right to education to children up to age 14, later codified by Article 21A (86th Amendment, 2002) and the RTE Act, 2009.
Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P. (1993): Right to Education
AIR 1993 SC 2178; (1993) 1 SCC 645
In this five-judge case, Jeevan Reddy J. (for himself and Pandian J.) and Mohan J. held that the right to education flows from Article 21 read with the Directive Principles, so every child has a right to free education until completing age 14, and after that it is subject to the State's economic capacity. Sharma CJ and Bharucha J. expressed no opinion on that point, though all agreed there is no fundamental right to a professional degree. The Court narrowed Mohini Jain (1992) and framed a "free seat / payment seat" scheme, later struck down in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (2002). The age 6 to 14 right is now an express fundamental right under Article 21A.
Case Summary: Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India
AIR 1984 SC 802
The Supreme Court treated a letter from Bandhua Mukti Morcha as a writ petition under Article 32, appointed a commission to investigate bonded labour in Faridabad stone quarries, and held (Bhagwati J., with Pathak and Sen JJ. concurring) that anyone shown to be a forced labourer is presumed a bonded labourer unless the employer/State proves otherwise. The right to live with dignity under Article 21 was read with the Directive Principles to require not just release but rehabilitation. The Court issued detailed directions and enforced the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976.
NALSA v. Union of India (2014)
(2014) 5 SCC 438
The Supreme Court recognised transgender persons as a third gender, held that the right to self-identify one's gender flows from Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21, and directed Central and State governments to frame welfare schemes and extend reservations to the transgender community. In 2026, Parliament removed the statutory right to self-perceived gender identity, and that amendment is under challenge in the Supreme Court.
Case Summary: Aruna Shanbaug v. Union of India
(2011) 4 SCC 454
Deciding the plea of Aruna Shanbaug — a KEM Hospital nurse left in a permanent vegetative state by a 1973 assault — the Supreme Court (Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra JJ., 7 March 2011) drew a line between active euthanasia (unlawful) and passive euthanasia (withdrawal of life support), and permitted the latter for PVS patients under High Court supervision and a doctors' committee until Parliament legislated. It refused euthanasia for Aruna herself, holding the KEM nurses who cared for her were her real next friends. Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) later recognised the right to die with dignity under Article 21 and legalised living wills; the Supreme Court simplified that procedure in 2023.
Case Summary: Shreya Singhal v. Union of India
AIR 2015 SC 1523
In its most important free-speech judgment of the internet era, the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000 as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad — it criminalised "grossly offensive" or "annoying" online speech without distinguishing protected discussion and advocacy from punishable incitement, and was not saved by Article 19(2). The Court read down Section 79 (intermediaries need act only on a court order or government notification) and upheld Section 69A (blocking) for its procedural safeguards. Despite being void, Section 66A continued to be used for years — the "zombie law" problem the Court later moved to stop.
Shah Bano Case (1985): Muslim Women & Maintenance
1985 AIR 945, (1985) 2 SCC 556
In Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985), a five-judge bench led by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud held that a divorced Muslim woman who cannot maintain herself is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC beyond the iddat period — the secular provision applies to all citizens regardless of religion. The political backlash led to the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which appeared to limit the husband's liability to iddat; but in Danial Latifi (2001) the Court read the Act down to require a fair lifetime provision, and in 2024 reaffirmed that Muslim women can still claim under Section 125.
Case Summary: S.R. Bommai v. Union of India
AIR 1994 SC 1918; 1994 SCC (3) 1; [1994] 2 SCR 644
Nine-judge bench (11 March 1994) held: (1) Art 356 proclamations are subject to judicial review; (2) majority must be proved on the floor of the House, not by the Governor's subjective satisfaction; (3) state assembly can only be suspended — not dissolved — before Parliament approves the proclamation; (4) federalism and secularism are basic features of the Constitution. The landmark case that curbed the political misuse of President's Rule.
Case Summary: Obergefell v. Hodges 2015
576 U.S. 644 (2015)
On 26 June 2015 the U.S. Supreme Court held 5-4 (Kennedy J.) that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees same-sex couples the fundamental right to marry and requires states to recognise same-sex marriages performed elsewhere — legalising marriage equality nationwide and overruling Baker v. Nelson. Four justices dissented (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito). Congress later codified federal recognition in the Respect for Marriage Act (2022) after Justice Thomas's Dobbs concurrence urged revisiting the case. India took the opposite path: in Supriyo v. Union of India (2023) the Supreme Court declined to legalise same-sex marriage, leaving it to Parliament.
Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980): Basic Structure
AIR 1980 SC 1789, (1980) 3 SCC 625
A five-judge Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud struck down two parts of the 42nd Amendment (1976). Article 368(4) and (5) — which barred judicial review of amendments and declared Parliament's amending power unlimited — were void, because a limited amending power and judicial review are themselves part of the basic structure. The amendment to Article 31C — extending immunity to laws implementing ANY directive principle — was also struck down for destroying the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. Justice Bhagwati agreed on Article 368 but dissented on Article 31C.
Case Summary: Wisconsin v Yoder (1972)
406 U.S. 205 (1972)
Six justices held that Wisconsin's compulsory attendance law violated the Free Exercise Clause as applied to Old Order Amish families. The state could not show a compelling interest sufficient to override the sincere religious burden. Justice Douglas partially dissented, arguing the children's own wishes should have been separately assessed.
Case Summary: Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission
584 U.S. 617 (2018)
Baker Jack Phillips refused to make a custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple on religious grounds, and the Colorado Civil Rights Commission found he had violated the state public-accommodations law. The Supreme Court reversed 7-2 (Kennedy J.), but narrowly: it held the Commission had shown unconstitutional hostility to Phillips's faith — a commissioner had likened his beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust, and the Commission had treated other bakers more leniently. The Court did not decide whether a business has a free-speech or free-exercise right to refuse such services; that question was later answered (for expressive products) in 303 Creative v. Elenis (2023).
Case Summary: Reynolds v. United States
98 U.S. 145 (1879)
US Supreme Court (6 Jan 1879, 98 U.S. 145), unanimous on the religious question: the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act does not violate the First Amendment. Religious belief cannot be outlawed; religious practice can be regulated when it conflicts with general laws. CJ Waite drew the foundational belief-action distinction. Reynolds was a deliberate test case organised by Mormon leadership. The doctrine later influenced Sherbert (1963) and Employment Division v Smith (1990).
Case Summary: Employment Division v. Smith
494 U.S. 872 (1990)
Two counsellors, members of the Native American Church, were fired and denied unemployment benefits in Oregon for ingesting peyote in a religious ceremony. The Supreme Court held 6-3 (Scalia J.) that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt religious believers from a neutral, generally applicable law, so Oregon's drug ban applied — sidelining the Sherbert "compelling interest" test (which the Court confined to unemployment cases and "hybrid" rights). O'Connor J. concurred only in the result, and Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall dissented. Congress responded with RFRA (1993), which City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) limited to the federal government; the 1994 amendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act legalised sacramental peyote; and Fulton v. Philadelphia (2021) narrowed Smith without overruling it. St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy, argued in November 2026, is undecided.
Case Summary: Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain
AIR 1975 SC 2299
After the Allahabad High Court set aside Indira Gandhi's 1971 election for corrupt practices, the 39th Amendment inserted Article 329A to place her election beyond judicial review. On appeal, the Supreme Court (7 Nov 1975) struck down clause (4) of Article 329A for violating the basic structure — the first use of the Kesavananda doctrine against a constitutional amendment — but allowed her appeal on the merits because the Representation of the People Act had been amended retrospectively. The Emergency (declared 25 June 1975) followed the High Court verdict, not this judgment.
Case Summary: Golaknath v. State of Punjab
AIR 1967 SC 1643
An 11-judge bench held 6:5 that Parliament has no power to amend Part III to abridge Fundamental Rights, reasoning that an amendment is "law" under Article 13(2). To avoid chaos, Chief Justice Subba Rao applied prospective overruling, leaving past amendments intact. Parliament replied with the 24th Amendment (1971), and Kesavananda Bharati (1973) overruled Golaknath, replacing its absolute bar with the basic structure doctrine.
Sherbert v. Verner (1963): Case Summary & the Sherbert Test
374 U.S. 398 (1963)
Sherbert v. Verner (1963) is the US Supreme Court case that strengthened religious freedom under the First Amendment. Adell Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, was denied unemployment benefits for refusing to work on her Saturday Sabbath. The Court (7-2) ruled for her and created the "Sherbert test": the government must show a compelling interest, pursued by the least restrictive means, before it can substantially burden religious practice.
Case Summary: Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.
73 N.Y.2d 487 (1989)
Because the anti-miscarriage drug DES was sold generically by many makers, women injured in utero decades earlier could not identify which company made the pills their mothers took. In Hymowitz (1989, Wachtler C.J.) the New York Court of Appeals adopted a DES-specific national market-share liability: each defendant pays its share of the national DES market, liability is several only (not joint), and a maker cannot escape by proving it did not make the particular pill — it can exculpate only by showing it never marketed DES for pregnancy. The Court also upheld New York's statute reviving time-barred DES claims.
Case Summary: Raffles v. Wichelhaus 1864 - The Peerless Case
(1864) 2 Hurl & C 906; 159 ER 375
The Court of Exchequer (Pollock CB, Martin B, Pigott B) gave judgment in 1864 for buyers who pleaded that they meant a ship "Peerless" sailing in October, when the seller offered cotton from another "Peerless" sailing in December. The court gave no reasons. Counsel's argument of latent ambiguity and no consensus ad idem is why the case is cited for those points.
Meeting of the Minds in Contract Law (Consensus ad idem)
"Meeting of the minds" (consensus ad idem) is the mutual agreement on the terms of a contract. This guide explains what it means, the objective standard courts use, how it is proved, and the leading cases — with the Indian Contract Act position.
Case Summary: Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co.
127 Mo. App. 383, 105 S.W. 777 (1907)
Embry ran the sample department of a St. Louis dry goods company under a one-year contract at $2,000 that expired on 15 December 1903. On 23 December he told the president, McKittrick, that he would quit unless he got a new contract. On his account McKittrick replied, "Go ahead, you're all right; get your men out and don't let that worry you." He was later discharged and sued. The trial court told the jury there was a contract only if both men intended one. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed and remanded: the test is objective, and if the conversation happened as Embry said and he understood he was employed, it was a valid contract as a matter of law.
Olley v. Marlborough Court Ltd (1949): Exclusion Clauses
[1949] 1 KB 532
The Court of Appeal held that a notice in a hotel bedroom disclaiming liability for stolen valuables was not part of the contract, because the contract was concluded at the reception desk before the guest could see the notice. An exclusion clause binds only if notice is given before or at the time the contract is made — and the hotel remained liable as a negligent bailee for Mrs Olley's stolen fur coat.
Case Summary: Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H
(2010) 5 SCC 663; AIR 2010 SC 1907
A three-judge Supreme Court bench (3 May 2010) allowed the compounding of a Section 138 cheque-dishonour offence, set aside the appellant's conviction, and framed guidelines to push parties to compound early: no cost at the first or second hearing, then 10%, 15% and 20% of the cheque amount at later stages. Courts may reduce these costs for recorded reasons. In 2025, Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar modified the scale to nil, 5%, 7.5% and 10%.
Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v. Union of India (2018): Case Summary
AIR 2018 SC 4273; (2018) 10 SCC 443
A three-judge Supreme Court bench (14 September 2018) held that the Family Welfare Committee direction in Rajesh Sharma (2017) was not in accord with the statutory framework. It modified the settlement direction, kept the protective directions on bail and Red Corner Notices, and told investigating officers to follow Joginder Kumar, D.K. Basu, Lalita Kumari and Arnesh Kumar.
Case Summary: Rajesh Sharma v State of U.P. (2017)
(2018) 10 SCC 472
A two-judge bench (Goel and Lalit JJ.) laid down safeguards, including Family Welfare Committees, to prevent misuse of Section 498A IPC. A year later, a three-judge bench in Social Action Forum (2018) held the Committee direction impermissible and modified the settlement direction, while keeping the protective directions on bail and red corner notices. From 1 July 2024 the provision is BNS §85/§86, and the Arnesh Kumar safeguards remain.
Case Summary: Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar 2014
(2014) 8 SCC 273
Arnesh Kumar, apprehending arrest in a §498A IPC / Dowry Prohibition Act case brought by his wife, reached the Supreme Court after being refused anticipatory bail. The Court (Chandramauli Kr. Prasad and Pinaki Chandra Ghose JJ., 2 July 2014) used the case to curb reflexive arrests: for §498A and any offence punishable up to 7 years, police must not arrest automatically but must justify arrest against the §41(1)(b) CrPC checklist, issue a §41A notice of appearance where arrest is unnecessary, and magistrates must not authorise detention mechanically. Citing NCRB data (about 1.97 lakh arrested under §498A in 2012, ~15% conviction), the Court treated arrest as an exception. The guidelines continue under BNS §85/§86 and BNSS §35.
Case Summary: Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India 2005
AIR 2005 SC 3100; (2005) 6 SCC 281
A two-judge bench (Pasayat and Sema JJ.) upheld Section 498A IPC on 19 July 2005, holding that the mere possibility of abuse does not invalidate a law. It warned that misuse could unleash "a new legal terrorism" and said the role of investigating agencies and courts is that of a watchdog and not a bloodhound. Section 498A is now BNS §85.
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)
(2017) 10 SCC 1
A 9-judge constitutional bench unanimously held on 24 August 2017 that the right to privacy is a fundamental right under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution, overruling M.P. Sharma (1954) and Kharak Singh (1963) on this point.
Case Summary: V. Revathi v. Union of India 1988
AIR 1988 SC 835; (1988) 2 SCC 72
The Supreme Court in 1988 upheld Section 198(2) CrPC, read with Section 497 IPC, rejecting a wife's argument under Article 14 that barring her from prosecuting her adulterous husband was discrimination on the ground of sex. The law was finally struck down in Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018).
Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India (1985): Case Summary
1985 Supp SCC 137
In Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India (1985), the Supreme Court (Chandrachud CJ) upheld Section 497 IPC, rejecting the challenge that the adultery offence was gender-discriminatory. Section 497 was finally struck down only in 2018 in Joseph Shine v. Union of India.
Civil vs. Criminal Cases in India: Key Differences and Examples
A civil case asks a court to resolve a dispute or enforce a right. A criminal case asks whether the accused committed an offence. See how the two differ in India, with examples.
Case Summary: Foss v. Harbottle 1843
(1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189
Court of Chancery (Wigram VC, 1843): two principles — (1) the company is the proper plaintiff for wrongs done to it; (2) if a majority can ratify the act complained of, the court will not interfere at the suit of a minority. Four exceptions: fraud on minority (wrongdoers in control), ultra vires acts, special majority required, personal rights of shareholders infringed. Indian equivalent: §241 Companies Act 2013 (oppression/mismanagement) and §245 (class action).
Case Summary: Entick v Carrington (1765)
(1765) 19 St Tr 1029; 95 ER 807
The Court of Common Pleas held that a Secretary of State's warrant to search a house and seize a person's papers had no legal basis. Every invasion of private property is a trespass, and an officer who enters must justify it by law.
Dickinson v. Dodds (1876): Revocation of an Offer
(1876) 2 Ch D 463
Dodds offered to sell houses to Dickinson for £800, the offer "to be left over until Friday 9 a.m." Before then, Dickinson heard from a third party (Berry) that Dodds had sold to someone else (Allan). His later acceptance failed. The Court of Appeal held the promise to keep the offer open was not binding (no consideration for it), an offer can be revoked any time before acceptance, and a reliable third party's notice of the sale was as effective as a withdrawal by Dodds himself — so there was no meeting of minds.
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256
[1893] 1 QB 256
The Carbolic Smoke Ball Co advertised a £100 reward to anyone who used their product and still caught influenza. Mrs. Carlill did — and the Court of Appeal held that the advertisement was a binding unilateral contract and she was entitled to the £100.
Case Summary: Braunfeld v. Brown 1961
366 U.S. 599 (1961)
Six justices upheld Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law in 1961: Warren CJ (plurality, 4) + Frankfurter and Harlan JJ (concurring). The law imposed only an indirect economic burden on Orthodox Jewish Sabbatarians — it did not make religious observance unlawful. Brennan and Stewart JJ dissented. Distinguished by Sherbert (1963); largely restored by Employment Division v. Smith (1990).
Case Summary: Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories 1980
26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924 (1980)
Explore the landmark Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories 1980 case, pivotal in establishing market share liability in product liability law. Learn more now!
Lucy v. Zehmer (1954): Case Summary & Objective Theory
196 Va. 493; 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954)
Lucy v. Zehmer (1954) is the classic "was it a joke?" contract case. Zehmer scrawled an agreement to sell his farm for $50,000 on the back of a restaurant check after an evening of drinking, then claimed he was only joking. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held the contract binding: under the objective theory of contracts, what matters is how a reasonable person would read your words and acts — not your secret intention.
Krell v. Henry (1903): Case Summary & Frustration of Purpose
[1903] 2 KB 740
Krell v. Henry (1903) is the famous "coronation case" that established frustration of purpose in contract law. Henry hired a London flat purely to watch Edward VII's coronation procession; when the King fell ill and the procession was cancelled, the Court of Appeal held the contract was frustrated and Henry did not have to pay the balance — even though the room could still physically be used. Note: Krell, the owner, lost.
Parker v. South Eastern Railway (1877): Reasonable Notice
(1877) 2 CPD 416
Parker deposited a bag in a railway cloakroom and got a ticket reading "See back"; the back limited the company's liability to £10. His bag (worth more) was lost. The Court of Appeal held a person can be bound by printed conditions he has not read — but only if the company did what was reasonably sufficient to give him notice of them. Because that question of reasonable notice had not been properly put to the jury, the Court ordered a new trial. The case is the source of the "reasonable notice" test for incorporating exclusion clauses.
ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976): Case Summary
AIR 1976 SC 1207; (1976) 2 SCC 521
ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976), the "Habeas Corpus Case", is widely seen as the Supreme Court's darkest hour: by 4-1 it held that during the Emergency even the right to life under Article 21 could not be enforced. Justice H.R. Khanna's lone dissent cost him the Chief Justiceship — and was vindicated when the case was finally overruled in Puttaswamy (2017).
R v. Dudley and Stephens (1884): Necessity & Murder
(1884) 14 QBD 273
After the yacht Mignonette sank, four men were cast adrift. About 20 days in, Captain Dudley and Stephens killed the dying cabin boy, Richard Parker, and ate his body to survive; a third man, Brooks, refused to take part. A five-judge Divisional Court (Lord Coleridge CJ) held that necessity is no defence to the murder of an innocent person. The two were sentenced to death, later commuted to six months' imprisonment.
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act: Cheque Bounce Law
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 makes dishonour of a cheque issued for a legally enforceable debt a criminal offence in India. This guide explains the 30-day notice and 15-day payment timeline, the one-month deadline to file a complaint, penalties up to two years, and the leading Supreme Court rulings.
Section 498A IPC (Now Section 85 BNS): Cruelty Explained
Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code criminalised cruelty against a married woman by her husband or his relatives. From 1 July 2024 it is re-enacted, almost word for word, as Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, with the definition of "cruelty" in Section 86. This guide covers the offence, the cruelty test, dowry-harassment links and the leading Supreme Court rulings on misuse.
Case Brief: Balfour v. Balfour 1919: A Landmark Case in Contract Law
[1919] 2 KB 571
The Court of Appeal (Warrington, Duke and Atkin LJJ) held in 1919 that a husband's promise of £30 a month to his wife was an ordinary domestic arrangement, not a contract, because the parties did not intend legal consequences. Later law treats this as a rebuttable presumption against contractual intent between spouses. Distinguished in Merritt v Merritt (1970).
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985): Case Summary
AIR 1986 SC 180; (1985) 3 SCC 545
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) read the "right to livelihood" into the right to life under Article 21. A five-judge bench unanimously held that a person cannot be deprived of livelihood except by a fair and reasonable procedure. Yet the Court upheld Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act and found the Commissioner justified in removing the pavement dwellings, while barring eviction until 31 October 1985 and directing alternative sites for some dwellers.
Case Summary: Joseph Shine v. Union of India 2018
AIR 2018 SC 4898
In Joseph Shine (27 Sep 2018), a five-judge bench led by CJI Dipak Misra unanimously struck down Section 497 IPC and Section 198(2) CrPC, decriminalising adultery. The colonial provision punished only the man, treated the wife as her husband's property and denied women agency — violating equality (Arts 14, 15) and dignity/privacy (Art 21). Four concurring opinions (Misra-Khanwilkar, Nariman, Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra) overruled Yusuf Abdul Aziz (1954), Sowmithri Vishnu (1985) and V. Revathi (1988). Adultery remains a ground for divorce, but it was not re-enacted in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
Case Summary: Shayara Bano v. Union of India 2017
(2017) 9 SCC 1; AIR 2017 SC 4609
Five-judge Constitution bench (3:2) set aside talaq-e-biddat on 22 August 2017. Nariman and Lalit JJ. held it manifestly arbitrary under Article 14, and held the 1937 Shariat Act void to that extent. Kurian Joseph J. held that what is bad in theology is bad in law as well. Khehar CJ and Nazeer J. dissented, but would have barred the practice for six months while Parliament legislated. The Muslim Women Act 2019 made pronouncing it an offence with up to 3 years' imprisonment.
Case Summary: Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala 2018
(2018) 10 SCC 689
Five-judge Constitution bench (28 September 2018) held 4:1 that Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Rules 1965, which barred women aged 10 to 50 from Sabarimala, could not stand. Misra CJI and Khanwilkar J. held that it violated Article 25(1), that devotees of Lord Ayyappa are not a separate denomination, and that the rule was ultra vires Sections 3 and 4 of the 1965 Act. Nariman J. relied on Articles 25(1) and 15(1). Chandrachud J. wrote separately. Malhotra J. dissented. Review petitions were referred to a larger bench in 2019, and a nine-judge bench reserved judgment on 14 May 2026.
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997): Case Summary
(1997) 6 SCC 241; AIR 1997 SC 3011
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) is the case that created India's first rules against sexual harassment at work. After social worker Bhanwari Devi was gang-raped for trying to stop a child marriage, women's groups filed a PIL. With no law on the subject, the Supreme Court — drawing on the Constitution and the CEDAW convention — laid down the binding "Vishaka Guidelines", which governed until the POSH Act, 2013 replaced them.
Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981): Case Summary
1981 AIR 1829, (1981) 4 SCC 335, 1982 SCR (1) 438
A three-judge Supreme Court bench struck down two Air India air-hostess service rules — termination on first pregnancy and the Managing Director's unguided discretion over retirement age — as arbitrary and void under Article 14. But it UPHELD the bar on marrying within the first four years of service, and rejected the Article 15/16 sex-discrimination claim, holding that air hostesses and the (all-male) cabin-crew cadre formed separate classes, so the rules were not discrimination on the ground of sex alone.
Case Study: Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India 2018
AIR 2018 SC 4321; (2018) 10 SCC 1
Five-judge constitution bench (CJI Misra, Khanwilkar, Nariman, Chandrachud, Malhotra JJ) unanimously held on 6 September 2018 that §377 IPC, to the extent it criminalised consensual same-sex acts between adults, was unconstitutional — violating Arts 14, 15, 19 and 21. Overruled Suresh Kumar Koushal (2013). Four separate but converging opinions. §377 was omitted entirely from BNS 2023 (in force 1 Jul 2024). Same-sex marriage: denied by a five-judge bench in Supriyo v. Union of India (2023) — Parliament must legislate.
Mithu v. State of Punjab (1983): Mandatory Death Penalty
AIR 1983 SC 473; (1983) 2 SCC 277
A five-judge Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud struck down Section 303 of the IPC, which made death the only punishment for a life convict who commits murder. The Court found no rational justification for the distinction (Article 14) and held the mandatory sentence an unjust, unfair and unreasonable procedure (Article 21). After Mithu, all murders fall under Section 302, where death is one option and is reserved for the "rarest of rare" cases.
Case Summary: Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth
AIR 1977 SC 2328; (1977) 4 SCC 193; 1978 SCR (1) 423
Five-judge bench, 19 Sep 1977. By 3:2 the Court held that a High Court judge can be transferred under Article 222 without his consent. All five agreed the power exists only in the public interest and needs full and effective consultation with the CJI, whose opinion is not binding. The appeal itself ended in a settlement: the government agreed to send Justice Sheth back to Gujarat.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India: A Landmark Case in Indian Constitutional Law
AIR 1978 SC 597; (1978) 1 SCC 248
A seven-judge Supreme Court bench (25 January 1978) held that "procedure established by law" in Article 21 must be right, just and fair, not arbitrary, and that a law affecting personal liberty must also meet Articles 14 and 19. Natural justice was read into Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act. The majority did not quash the order, because the Attorney General agreed to hear her.
Sources of Law in Jurisprudence: Primary, Secondary & Tertiary
The sources of law are where legal rules come from. This guide explains the primary, secondary and tertiary sources of law in jurisprudence, how courts apply them, and Indian landmark examples.
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu: Case Summary & Notes
AIR 1974 SC 555; (1974) 4 SCC 3
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1973) is where the Supreme Court first held that arbitrary State action, by itself, violates the right to equality under Article 14 — the "new doctrine of arbitrariness". Ironically, Royappa lost: the Court dismissed his challenge to his transfer, but Justice Bhagwati's reasoning reshaped Indian equality law.
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) Case Summary
AIR 1952 SC 75; [1952] SCR 284
A seven-judge Supreme Court bench, by 6:1 (Patanjali Sastri C.J. dissenting), dismissed West Bengal's appeals and held Section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 invalid under Article 14, at least so far as it let the government send individual "cases" to a special court. With no guiding policy in the Act, that power was arbitrary, and the need for "speedier trial" gave no sound basis for the classification.
