Briefs & notes

Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006)

(2006) 8 SCC 1

In 2006, the Supreme Court issued seven binding directives to all states compelling structural police reforms, including State Security Commissions, fixed tenures for the DGP and field officers, separation of investigation from law-and-order functions, Police Establishment Boards, Police Complaints Authorities, and a National Security Commission.

Case Summary: D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal

AIR 1997 SC 610

Acting on a letter treated as a PIL, the Supreme Court (Kuldip Singh and A.S. Anand JJ., 18 Dec 1996) laid down 11 mandatory guidelines to prevent custodial torture and deaths — including visible police identification, an attested arrest memo, the right to have a relative informed, and a medical examination every 48 hours — as requirements flowing from Articles 21 and 22. Breach attracts departmental action, contempt, and public-law compensation (building on Nilabati Behera). The guidelines were later codified into the CrPC (§§41B, 41C, 41D, 50A, 55A) and now continue under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992): Case Summary

(1992) 3 SCC 666

In Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1992 SC 1858), the Supreme Court held that the right to education flows from the right to life under Article 21, and that charging capitation fees is arbitrary and violates Articles 14 and 21. The sweeping ruling was narrowed a year later in Unni Krishnan (1993), which limited the fundamental right to education to children up to age 14, later codified by Article 21A (86th Amendment, 2002) and the RTE Act, 2009.

Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P. (1993): Right to Education

(1993) 1 SCC 645, AIR 1993 SC 2178

A five-judge Constitution Bench held that the right to education flows from the right to life under Article 21, read with the Directive Principles. Free education is a fundamental right for every child up to age 14; beyond that, it is subject to the State's economic capacity (Article 41). The Court narrowed the wider ruling in Mohini Jain (1992), held that running an educational institution is not a trade for profit, and devised a "free seat / payment seat" scheme to curb capitation fees — a scheme later struck down in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (2002). The age 6–14 right is now an express fundamental right under Article 21A.

Case Summary: Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India

AIR 1984 SC 802

The Supreme Court treated a letter from Bandhua Mukti Morcha as a writ petition under Article 32, appointed a commission to investigate bonded labour in Faridabad stone quarries, and held (Bhagwati J., with Pathak and Sen JJ. concurring) that anyone shown to be a forced labourer is presumed a bonded labourer unless the employer/State proves otherwise. The right to live with dignity under Article 21 was read with the Directive Principles to require not just release but rehabilitation. The Court issued detailed directions and enforced the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976.

NALSA v. Union of India (2014)

(2014) 5 SCC 438

The Supreme Court recognised transgender persons as a third gender, held that the right to self-identify one's gender flows from Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21, and directed Central and State governments to frame welfare schemes and extend reservations to the transgender community.

Case Summary: Aruna Shanbaug v. Union of India

(2011) 4 SCC 454

Deciding the plea of Aruna Shanbaug — a KEM Hospital nurse left in a permanent vegetative state by a 1973 assault — the Supreme Court (Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra JJ., 7 March 2011) drew a line between active euthanasia (unlawful) and passive euthanasia (withdrawal of life support), and permitted the latter for PVS patients under High Court supervision and a doctors' committee until Parliament legislated. It refused euthanasia for Aruna herself, holding the KEM nurses who cared for her were her real next friends. Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) later recognised the right to die with dignity under Article 21 and legalised living wills; the Supreme Court simplified that procedure in 2023.

Case Summary: Shreya Singhal v. Union of India

AIR 2015 SC 1523

In its most important free-speech judgment of the internet era, the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000 as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad — it criminalised "grossly offensive" or "annoying" online speech without distinguishing protected discussion and advocacy from punishable incitement, and was not saved by Article 19(2). The Court read down Section 79 (intermediaries need act only on a court order or government notification) and upheld Section 69A (blocking) for its procedural safeguards. Despite being void, Section 66A continued to be used for years — the "zombie law" problem the Court later moved to stop.

Shah Bano Case (1985): Muslim Women & Maintenance

1985 AIR 945, (1985) 2 SCC 556

In Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985), a five-judge bench led by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud held that a divorced Muslim woman who cannot maintain herself is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC beyond the iddat period — the secular provision applies to all citizens regardless of religion. The political backlash led to the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which appeared to limit the husband's liability to iddat; but in Danial Latifi (2001) the Court read the Act down to require a fair lifetime provision, and in 2024 reaffirmed that Muslim women can still claim under Section 125.

Case Summary: S.R. Bommai v. Union of India

AIR 1994 SC 1918; 1994 SCC (3) 1; [1994] 2 SCR 644

Nine-judge bench (11 March 1994) held: (1) Art 356 proclamations are subject to judicial review; (2) majority must be proved on the floor of the House, not by the Governor's subjective satisfaction; (3) state assembly can only be suspended — not dissolved — before Parliament approves the proclamation; (4) federalism and secularism are basic features of the Constitution. The landmark case that curbed the political misuse of President's Rule.

Case Summary: Obergefell v. Hodges 2015

576 U.S. 644 (2015)

On 26 June 2015 the U.S. Supreme Court held 5-4 (Kennedy J.) that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees same-sex couples the fundamental right to marry and requires states to recognise same-sex marriages performed elsewhere — legalising marriage equality nationwide and overruling Baker v. Nelson. Four justices dissented (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito). Congress later codified federal recognition in the Respect for Marriage Act (2022) after Justice Thomas's Dobbs concurrence urged revisiting the case. India took the opposite path: in Supriyo v. Union of India (2023) the Supreme Court declined to legalise same-sex marriage, leaving it to Parliament.

Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980): Basic Structure

AIR 1980 SC 1789, (1980) 3 SCC 625

A five-judge Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud struck down two parts of the 42nd Amendment (1976). Article 368(4) and (5) — which barred judicial review of amendments and declared Parliament's amending power unlimited — were void, because a limited amending power and judicial review are themselves part of the basic structure. The amendment to Article 31C — extending immunity to laws implementing ANY directive principle — was also struck down for destroying the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. Justice Bhagwati agreed on Article 368 but dissented on Article 31C.

Case Summary: Wisconsin v Yoder (1972)

406 U.S. 205 (1972)

Six justices held that Wisconsin's compulsory attendance law violated the Free Exercise Clause as applied to Old Order Amish families. The state could not show a compelling interest sufficient to override the sincere religious burden. Justice Douglas partially dissented, arguing the children's own wishes should have been separately assessed.

Case Summary: Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission

584 U.S. 617 (2018)

Baker Jack Phillips refused to make a custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple on religious grounds, and the Colorado Civil Rights Commission found he had violated the state public-accommodations law. The Supreme Court reversed 7-2 (Kennedy J.), but narrowly: it held the Commission had shown unconstitutional hostility to Phillips's faith — a commissioner had likened his beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust, and the Commission had treated other bakers more leniently. The Court did not decide whether a business has a free-speech or free-exercise right to refuse such services; that question was later answered (for expressive products) in 303 Creative v. Elenis (2023).

Case Summary: Reynolds v. United States

98 U.S. 145 (1879)

Unanimous US Supreme Court (6 Jan 1879, 98 U.S. 145): the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act does not violate the First Amendment. Religious belief cannot be outlawed; religious practice can be regulated when it conflicts with general laws. CJ Waite drew the foundational belief-action distinction. Reynolds was a deliberate test case organised by Mormon leadership. The doctrine later influenced Sherbert (1963) and Employment Division v Smith (1990).

Case Summary: Employment Division v. Smith

494 U.S. 872 (1990)

Two counsellors, members of the Native American Church, were fired and denied unemployment benefits in Oregon for ingesting peyote in a religious ceremony. The Supreme Court held 6-3 (Scalia J.) that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt religious believers from a neutral, generally applicable law, so Oregon's drug ban applied — sidelining the Sherbert "compelling interest" test (which the Court confined to unemployment cases and "hybrid" rights). O'Connor J. concurred only in the result, and Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall dissented. Congress responded with RFRA (1993), which City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) limited to the federal government; the 1994 amendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act legalised sacramental peyote; and Fulton v. Philadelphia (2021) narrowed Smith without overruling it.

Case Summary: Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain

AIR 1975 SC 2299

After the Allahabad High Court set aside Indira Gandhi's 1971 election for corrupt practices, the 39th Amendment inserted Article 329A to place her election beyond judicial review. On appeal, the Supreme Court (7 Nov 1975) struck down clause (4) of Article 329A for violating the basic structure — the first use of the Kesavananda doctrine against a constitutional amendment — but allowed her appeal on the merits because the Representation of the People Act had been amended retrospectively. The Emergency (declared 25 June 1975) followed the High Court verdict, not this judgment.

Case Summary: Golaknath v. State of Punjab

AIR 1967 SC 1643

An 11-judge bench held 6:5 that Parliament has no power to amend Part III to abridge Fundamental Rights, reasoning that an amendment is "law" under Article 13(2). To avoid chaos, Chief Justice Subba Rao applied prospective overruling, leaving past amendments intact. Parliament replied with the 24th Amendment (1971), and Kesavananda Bharati (1973) overruled Golaknath, replacing its absolute bar with the basic structure doctrine.

Sherbert v. Verner (1963): Case Summary & the Sherbert Test

374 U.S. 398 (1963)

Sherbert v. Verner (1963) is the US Supreme Court case that strengthened religious freedom under the First Amendment. Adell Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, was denied unemployment benefits for refusing to work on her Saturday Sabbath. The Court (7-2) ruled for her and created the "Sherbert test": the government must show a compelling interest, pursued by the least restrictive means, before it can substantially burden religious practice.

Case Summary: Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.

73 N.Y.2d 487 (1989)

Because the anti-miscarriage drug DES was sold generically by many makers, women injured in utero decades earlier could not identify which company made the pills their mothers took. In Hymowitz (1989, Wachtler C.J.) the New York Court of Appeals adopted a DES-specific national market-share liability: each defendant pays its share of the national DES market, liability is several only (not joint), and a maker cannot escape by proving it did not make the particular pill — it can exculpate only by showing it never marketed DES for pregnancy. The Court also upheld New York's statute reviving time-barred DES claims.

Case Summary: Raffles v. Wichelhaus 1864 - The Peerless Case

(1864) 2 Hurl & C 906; 159 ER 375

Court of Exchequer (Pollock CB, Martin B, Pigott B) held in 1864 that where a contract term (ship "Peerless") was latently ambiguous and each party meant a different ship, there was no consensus ad idem and no binding contract. The leading English authority on latent ambiguity and mutual mistake in contract formation.

Meeting of the Minds in Contract Law (Consensus ad idem)

"Meeting of the minds" (consensus ad idem) is the mutual agreement on the terms of a contract. This guide explains what it means, the objective standard courts use, how it is proved, and the leading cases — with the Indian Contract Act position.

Case Summary: Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co.

127 Mo. App. 383, 105 S.W. 777 (1907)

Embry, employed for one year at $2,000 under a written contract expiring 15 December 1903, pressed his employer's president McKittrick for a renewal and threatened to quit; McKittrick replied, "Go ahead, you're all right; get your men out, and don't let that worry you." About two months later Embry was fired and sued for the year's salary. The trial court told the jury there was a contract only if BOTH men intended one, and the jury found for the company. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed and remanded: under the objective theory of contracts, if McKittrick's words would lead a reasonable person to believe a contract was made, a contract was formed — his secret intent was irrelevant.

Olley v. Marlborough Court Ltd (1949): Exclusion Clauses

[1949] 1 KB 532

The Court of Appeal held that a notice in a hotel bedroom disclaiming liability for stolen valuables was not part of the contract, because the contract was concluded at the reception desk before the guest could see the notice. An exclusion clause binds only if notice is given before or at the time the contract is made — and the hotel remained liable as a negligent bailee for Mrs Olley's stolen fur coat.

Case Summary: Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H

(2010) 5 SCC 663

Two-judge SC bench (3 May 2010) held that §147 Negotiable Instruments Act enables compounding of §138 cheque-dishonour offences at any stage — magistrate, sessions, HC, or SC. Introduced a graded cost scheme: nil at first hearings, 10% before magistrate, 15% before sessions/HC, 20% before SC, payable to Legal Services Authority. Later SC judgment clarified these guidelines are not mandatory in every case.

Case Summary: Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v. Union of India

Discover the 2018 Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v. Union of India case, Supreme Court's Section 498A IPC guidelines, and their effects on dowry laws.

Case Summary: Rajesh Sharma v State of U.P. (2017)

(2018) 10 SCC 472

A two-judge bench laid down safeguards — including Family Welfare Committees — to prevent misuse of Section 498A IPC in dowry harassment cases. A year later, a three-judge bench in Social Action Forum (2018) scrapped the FWC mechanism as impermissible. From 1 July 2024 the provision is BNS §85/§86; the Arnesh Kumar arrest-checklist safeguards remain.

Case Summary: Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar 2014

(2014) 8 SCC 273

Arnesh Kumar, apprehending arrest in a §498A IPC / Dowry Prohibition Act case brought by his wife, reached the Supreme Court after being refused anticipatory bail. The Court (Chandramauli Kr. Prasad and Pinaki Chandra Ghose JJ., 2 July 2014) used the case to curb reflexive arrests: for §498A and any offence punishable up to 7 years, police must not arrest automatically but must justify arrest against the §41(1)(b) CrPC checklist, issue a §41A notice of appearance where arrest is unnecessary, and magistrates must not authorise detention mechanically. Citing NCRB data (about 1.97 lakh arrested under §498A in 2012, ~15% conviction), the Court treated arrest as an exception. The guidelines continue under BNS §85/§86 and BNSS §35.

Case Summary: Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India 2005

AIR 2005 SC 3100; W.P. (C) No. 141 of 2005

Two-judge bench (Pasayat & Sema JJ.) upheld §498A IPC as constitutional on 19 July 2005; mere possibility of misuse does not invalidate a law. Issued the "watchdog, not bloodhound" standard for investigating agencies. §498A is now BNS §85.

K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

(2017) 10 SCC 1

A 9-judge constitutional bench unanimously held on 24 August 2017 that the right to privacy is a fundamental right under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution, overruling M.P. Sharma (1954) and Kharak Singh (1963) on this point.

Case Summary: V. Revathi v. Union of India 1988

AIR 1988 SC 835

The Supreme Court in 1988 upheld Section 497 IPC (adultery) and Section 198(2) CrPC, rejecting the petitioner's argument that denying wives the right to prosecute their adulterous husbands was discriminatory under Arts 14, 15 and 21. The provision was finally struck down in Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018).

Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India (1985): Case Summary

1985 Supp SCC 137

In Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India (1985), the Supreme Court (Chandrachud CJ) upheld Section 497 IPC, rejecting the challenge that the adultery offence was gender-discriminatory. Section 497 was finally struck down only in 2018 in Joseph Shine v. Union of India.

Difference Between Civil Law and Criminal Law (With Examples)

Civil law resolves private disputes and awards compensation; criminal law punishes wrongs against society. This India-focused guide compares their purpose, who starts the case, the standard of proof, procedure and outcomes, with examples.

Case Summary: Foss v. Harbottle 1843

(1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189

Court of Chancery (Wigram VC, 1843): two principles — (1) the company is the proper plaintiff for wrongs done to it; (2) if a majority can ratify the act complained of, the court will not interfere at the suit of a minority. Four exceptions: fraud on minority (wrongdoers in control), ultra vires acts, special majority required, personal rights of shareholders infringed. Indian equivalent: §241 Companies Act 2013 (oppression/mismanagement) and §245 (class action).

Case Summary: Entick v Carrington (1765)

(1765) 19 St Tr 1029; 95 ER 807

The Court of Common Pleas held unanimously that a general warrant from the Secretary of State had no legal basis. Every invasion of private property is a trespass, and government may do nothing unless the law expressly permits it.

Dickinson v. Dodds (1876): Revocation of an Offer

(1876) 2 Ch D 463

Dodds offered to sell houses to Dickinson for £800, the offer "to be left over until Friday 9 a.m." Before then, Dickinson heard from a third party (Berry) that Dodds had sold to someone else (Allan). His later acceptance failed. The Court of Appeal held the promise to keep the offer open was not binding (no consideration for it), an offer can be revoked any time before acceptance, and a reliable third party's notice of the sale was as effective as a withdrawal by Dodds himself — so there was no meeting of minds.

Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256

[1893] 1 QB 256

The Carbolic Smoke Ball Co advertised a £100 reward to anyone who used their product and still caught influenza. Mrs. Carlill did — and the Court of Appeal held that the advertisement was a binding unilateral contract and she was entitled to the £100.

Case Summary: Braunfeld v. Brown 1961

366 U.S. 599 (1961)

Six justices upheld Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law in 1961: Warren CJ (plurality, 4) + Frankfurter and Harlan JJ (concurring). The law imposed only an indirect economic burden on Orthodox Jewish Sabbatarians — it did not make religious observance unlawful. Brennan and Stewart JJ dissented. Distinguished by Sherbert (1963); largely restored by Employment Division v. Smith (1990).

Case Summary: Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories 1980

26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924 (1980)

Explore the landmark Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories 1980 case, pivotal in establishing market share liability in product liability law. Learn more now!

Lucy v. Zehmer (1954): Case Summary & Objective Theory

196 Va. 493; 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954)

Lucy v. Zehmer (1954) is the classic "was it a joke?" contract case. Zehmer scrawled an agreement to sell his farm for $50,000 on the back of a restaurant check after an evening of drinking, then claimed he was only joking. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held the contract binding: under the objective theory of contracts, what matters is how a reasonable person would read your words and acts — not your secret intention.

Krell v. Henry (1903): Case Summary & Frustration of Purpose

[1903] 2 KB 740

Krell v. Henry (1903) is the famous "coronation case" that established frustration of purpose in contract law. Henry hired a London flat purely to watch Edward VII's coronation procession; when the King fell ill and the procession was cancelled, the Court of Appeal held the contract was frustrated and Henry did not have to pay the balance — even though the room could still physically be used. Note: Krell, the owner, lost.

Parker v. South Eastern Railway (1877): Reasonable Notice

(1877) 2 CPD 416

Parker deposited a bag in a railway cloakroom and got a ticket reading "See back"; the back limited the company's liability to £10. His bag (worth more) was lost. The Court of Appeal held a person can be bound by printed conditions he has not read — but only if the company did what was reasonably sufficient to give him notice of them. Because that question of reasonable notice had not been properly put to the jury, the Court ordered a new trial. The case is the source of the "reasonable notice" test for incorporating exclusion clauses.

ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976): Case Summary

AIR 1976 SC 1207; (1976) 2 SCC 521

ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976), the "Habeas Corpus Case", is widely seen as the Supreme Court's darkest hour: by 4-1 it held that during the Emergency even the right to life under Article 21 could not be enforced. Justice H.R. Khanna's lone dissent cost him the Chief Justiceship — and was vindicated when the case was finally overruled in Puttaswamy (2017).

R v. Dudley and Stephens (1884): Necessity & Murder

(1884) 14 QBD 273

After the yacht Mignonette sank, four men were cast adrift. About 20 days in, Captain Dudley and Stephens killed the dying cabin boy, Richard Parker, and ate his body to survive; a third man, Brooks, refused to take part. A five-judge Divisional Court (Lord Coleridge CJ) held that necessity is no defence to the murder of an innocent person. The two were sentenced to death, later commuted to six months' imprisonment.

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act: Cheque Bounce Law

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 makes dishonour of a cheque issued for a legally enforceable debt a criminal offence in India. This guide explains the 30-day notice and 15-day payment timeline, the one-month deadline to file a complaint, penalties up to two years, and the leading Supreme Court rulings.

Section 498A IPC (Now Section 85 BNS): Cruelty Explained

Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code criminalised cruelty against a married woman by her husband or his relatives. From 1 July 2024 it is re-enacted, almost word for word, as Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, with the definition of "cruelty" in Section 86. This guide covers the offence, the cruelty test, dowry-harassment links and the leading Supreme Court rulings on misuse.

Case Brief: Balfour v. Balfour 1919: A Landmark Case in Contract Law

[1919] 2 KB 571

Court of Appeal (Atkin, Warrington & Duke LJJ) held in 1919 that spouses' domestic arrangements carry a rebuttable presumption against an intention to create legal relations — so Mr. Balfour's promise of £30/month was unenforceable. Distinguished in Merritt v Merritt (1970).

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985): Case Summary

AIR 1986 SC 180; (1985) 3 SCC 545

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) is the case that read the "right to livelihood" into the right to life under Article 21. A five-judge bench unanimously held that you cannot deprive a person of their livelihood except by fair and reasonable procedure. Yet, in a famous paradox, the Court still upheld the Municipality's power to evict the Mumbai pavement dwellers — softening it only with directions for humane treatment.

Case Summary: Joseph Shine v. Union of India 2018

AIR 2018 SC 4898

In Joseph Shine (27 Sep 2018), a five-judge bench led by CJI Dipak Misra unanimously struck down Section 497 IPC and Section 198(2) CrPC, decriminalising adultery. The colonial provision punished only the man, treated the wife as her husband's property and denied women agency — violating equality (Arts 14, 15) and dignity/privacy (Art 21). Four concurring opinions (Misra-Khanwilkar, Nariman, Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra) overruled Yusuf Abdul Aziz (1954), Sowmithri Vishnu (1985) and V. Revathi (1988). Adultery remains a ground for divorce, but it was not re-enacted in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

Case Summary: Shayara Bano v. Union of India 2017

(2017) 9 SCC 1

Five-judge Constitution bench (3:2) declared talaq-e-biddat unconstitutional on 22 August 2017. Nariman & Lalit JJ: manifestly arbitrary under Art 14 (1937 Shariat Act is "law in force" under Art 13). Kurian Joseph J: what is bad in theology cannot be good in law. Khehar CJ & Nazeer J dissented (personal law not subject to Part III). Muslim Women Act 2019 criminalized the practice with up to 3 years imprisonment.

Case Summary: Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala 2018

(2018) 10 SCC 689

Five-judge Constitution bench (28 September 2018) held 4:1 that Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Rules 1965 — which barred women aged 10–50 from Sabarimala — was unconstitutional: not an essential religious practice, and a violation of Arts 14, 15, 17 and 25. CJI Misra + Khanwilkar J. (joint majority); Nariman J. and Chandrachud J. wrote concurring opinions; Malhotra J. dissented. Multiple review petitions were referred to a 9-judge bench in Nov 2019; hearings concluded May 2026, judgment reserved.

Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997): Case Summary

(1997) 6 SCC 241; AIR 1997 SC 3011

Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) is the case that created India's first rules against sexual harassment at work. After social worker Bhanwari Devi was gang-raped for trying to stop a child marriage, women's groups filed a PIL. With no law on the subject, the Supreme Court — drawing on the Constitution and the CEDAW convention — laid down the binding "Vishaka Guidelines", which governed until the POSH Act, 2013 replaced them.

Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981): Case Summary

1981 AIR 1829, (1981) 4 SCC 335, 1982 SCR (1) 438

A three-judge Supreme Court bench struck down two Air India air-hostess service rules — termination on first pregnancy and the Managing Director's unguided discretion over retirement age — as arbitrary and void under Article 14. But it UPHELD the bar on marrying within the first four years of service, and rejected the Article 15/16 sex-discrimination claim, holding that air hostesses and the (all-male) cabin-crew cadre formed separate classes, so the rules were not discrimination on the ground of sex alone.

Case Study: Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India 2018

AIR 2018 SC 4321; 2018 (10) SCALE 386; W.P. (Cr.) No. 76 of 2016

Five-judge constitution bench (CJI Misra, Khanwilkar, Nariman, Chandrachud, Malhotra JJ) unanimously held on 6 September 2018 that §377 IPC, to the extent it criminalised consensual same-sex acts between adults, was unconstitutional — violating Arts 14, 15, 19 and 21. Overruled Suresh Kumar Koushal (2013). Four separate but converging opinions. §377 was omitted entirely from BNS 2023 (in force 1 Jul 2024). Same-sex marriage: denied by a five-judge bench in Supriyo v. Union of India (2023) — Parliament must legislate.

Mithu v. State of Punjab (1983): Mandatory Death Penalty

1983 AIR 473, (1983) 2 SCC 277

A five-judge Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud struck down Section 303 of the IPC — which made the death penalty the only punishment for a life convict who commits murder — as unconstitutional. By removing all judicial discretion and barring any consideration of mitigating circumstances, the section was arbitrary (Article 14) and imposed an unjust, unfair and unreasonable procedure (Article 21). After Mithu, such murders fall under Section 302, where the death penalty is discretionary and reserved for the "rarest of rare" cases.

Case Summary: Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth

AIR 1977 SC 2328; 1977 SCC (4) 193

Five-judge constitution bench (3:2 majority, 19 Sep 1977) held that "consultation" with the CJI under Art 222 is not a mere formality — the CJI's opinion carries primacy and judicial independence (a basic feature) limits the executive's transfer power. Superseded for appointments by the collegium cases (1993, 1998) but the basic-structure principle remains foundational.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India: A Landmark Case in Indian Constitutional Law

AIR 1978 SC 597

Supreme Court (7-judge bench, 25 Jan 1978) held that "procedure established by law" in Art 21 must be fair, just and reasonable — not arbitrary. Established the Golden Triangle of Arts 14/19/21 as interdependent rights; overruled the watertight-compartments view in A.K. Gopalan (1950). Passport impoundment without a hearing violated Art 21.

Sources of Law in Jurisprudence: Primary, Secondary & Tertiary

The sources of law are where legal rules come from. This guide explains the primary, secondary and tertiary sources of law in jurisprudence, how courts apply them, and Indian landmark examples.

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu: Case Summary & Notes

AIR 1974 SC 555; (1974) 4 SCC 3

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1973) is where the Supreme Court first held that arbitrary State action, by itself, violates the right to equality under Article 14 — the "new doctrine of arbitrariness". Ironically, Royappa lost: the Court dismissed his challenge to his transfer, but Justice Bhagwati's reasoning reshaped Indian equality law.

State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) Case Summary

AIR 1952 SC 75

A seven-judge Supreme Court bench, by 6:1 (Patanjali Sastri C.J. dissenting), struck down Section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 as violating Article 14. Letting the government pick individual "cases" for a special court with a truncated procedure — with no guiding policy in the statute — was an arbitrary classification bearing no rational nexus to the Act's stated object of "speedier trial".