Indian Constitution

Case Summary: D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal

AIR 1997 SC 610

Acting on a letter treated as a PIL, the Supreme Court (Kuldip Singh and A.S. Anand JJ., 18 Dec 1996) laid down 11 mandatory guidelines to prevent custodial torture and deaths — including visible police identification, an attested arrest memo, the right to have a relative informed, and a medical examination every 48 hours — as requirements flowing from Articles 21 and 22. Breach attracts departmental action, contempt, and public-law compensation (building on Nilabati Behera). The guidelines were later codified into the CrPC (§§41B, 41C, 41D, 50A, 55A) and now continue under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992): Case Summary

(1992) 3 SCC 666

In Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1992 SC 1858), the Supreme Court held that the right to education flows from the right to life under Article 21, and that charging capitation fees is arbitrary and violates Articles 14 and 21. The sweeping ruling was narrowed a year later in Unni Krishnan (1993), which limited the fundamental right to education to children up to age 14, later codified by Article 21A (86th Amendment, 2002) and the RTE Act, 2009.

Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P. (1993): Right to Education

(1993) 1 SCC 645, AIR 1993 SC 2178

A five-judge Constitution Bench held that the right to education flows from the right to life under Article 21, read with the Directive Principles. Free education is a fundamental right for every child up to age 14; beyond that, it is subject to the State's economic capacity (Article 41). The Court narrowed the wider ruling in Mohini Jain (1992), held that running an educational institution is not a trade for profit, and devised a "free seat / payment seat" scheme to curb capitation fees — a scheme later struck down in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (2002). The age 6–14 right is now an express fundamental right under Article 21A.

Case Summary: Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India

AIR 1984 SC 802

The Supreme Court treated a letter from Bandhua Mukti Morcha as a writ petition under Article 32, appointed a commission to investigate bonded labour in Faridabad stone quarries, and held (Bhagwati J., with Pathak and Sen JJ. concurring) that anyone shown to be a forced labourer is presumed a bonded labourer unless the employer/State proves otherwise. The right to live with dignity under Article 21 was read with the Directive Principles to require not just release but rehabilitation. The Court issued detailed directions and enforced the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976.

NALSA v. Union of India (2014)

(2014) 5 SCC 438

The Supreme Court recognised transgender persons as a third gender, held that the right to self-identify one's gender flows from Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21, and directed Central and State governments to frame welfare schemes and extend reservations to the transgender community.

Case Summary: Aruna Shanbaug v. Union of India

(2011) 4 SCC 454

Deciding the plea of Aruna Shanbaug — a KEM Hospital nurse left in a permanent vegetative state by a 1973 assault — the Supreme Court (Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra JJ., 7 March 2011) drew a line between active euthanasia (unlawful) and passive euthanasia (withdrawal of life support), and permitted the latter for PVS patients under High Court supervision and a doctors' committee until Parliament legislated. It refused euthanasia for Aruna herself, holding the KEM nurses who cared for her were her real next friends. Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) later recognised the right to die with dignity under Article 21 and legalised living wills; the Supreme Court simplified that procedure in 2023.

Shah Bano Case (1985): Muslim Women & Maintenance

1985 AIR 945, (1985) 2 SCC 556

In Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985), a five-judge bench led by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud held that a divorced Muslim woman who cannot maintain herself is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC beyond the iddat period — the secular provision applies to all citizens regardless of religion. The political backlash led to the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which appeared to limit the husband's liability to iddat; but in Danial Latifi (2001) the Court read the Act down to require a fair lifetime provision, and in 2024 reaffirmed that Muslim women can still claim under Section 125.

Case Summary: S.R. Bommai v. Union of India

AIR 1994 SC 1918; 1994 SCC (3) 1; [1994] 2 SCR 644

Nine-judge bench (11 March 1994) held: (1) Art 356 proclamations are subject to judicial review; (2) majority must be proved on the floor of the House, not by the Governor's subjective satisfaction; (3) state assembly can only be suspended — not dissolved — before Parliament approves the proclamation; (4) federalism and secularism are basic features of the Constitution. The landmark case that curbed the political misuse of President's Rule.

Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980): Basic Structure

AIR 1980 SC 1789, (1980) 3 SCC 625

A five-judge Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud struck down two parts of the 42nd Amendment (1976). Article 368(4) and (5) — which barred judicial review of amendments and declared Parliament's amending power unlimited — were void, because a limited amending power and judicial review are themselves part of the basic structure. The amendment to Article 31C — extending immunity to laws implementing ANY directive principle — was also struck down for destroying the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. Justice Bhagwati agreed on Article 368 but dissented on Article 31C.

Case Summary: Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain

AIR 1975 SC 2299

After the Allahabad High Court set aside Indira Gandhi's 1971 election for corrupt practices, the 39th Amendment inserted Article 329A to place her election beyond judicial review. On appeal, the Supreme Court (7 Nov 1975) struck down clause (4) of Article 329A for violating the basic structure — the first use of the Kesavananda doctrine against a constitutional amendment — but allowed her appeal on the merits because the Representation of the People Act had been amended retrospectively. The Emergency (declared 25 June 1975) followed the High Court verdict, not this judgment.

Case Summary: Golaknath v. State of Punjab

AIR 1967 SC 1643

An 11-judge bench held 6:5 that Parliament has no power to amend Part III to abridge Fundamental Rights, reasoning that an amendment is "law" under Article 13(2). To avoid chaos, Chief Justice Subba Rao applied prospective overruling, leaving past amendments intact. Parliament replied with the 24th Amendment (1971), and Kesavananda Bharati (1973) overruled Golaknath, replacing its absolute bar with the basic structure doctrine.

K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

(2017) 10 SCC 1

A 9-judge constitutional bench unanimously held on 24 August 2017 that the right to privacy is a fundamental right under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution, overruling M.P. Sharma (1954) and Kharak Singh (1963) on this point.

Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India (1985): Case Summary

1985 Supp SCC 137

In Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India (1985), the Supreme Court (Chandrachud CJ) upheld Section 497 IPC, rejecting the challenge that the adultery offence was gender-discriminatory. Section 497 was finally struck down only in 2018 in Joseph Shine v. Union of India.

ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976): Case Summary

AIR 1976 SC 1207; (1976) 2 SCC 521

ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976), the "Habeas Corpus Case", is widely seen as the Supreme Court's darkest hour: by 4-1 it held that during the Emergency even the right to life under Article 21 could not be enforced. Justice H.R. Khanna's lone dissent cost him the Chief Justiceship — and was vindicated when the case was finally overruled in Puttaswamy (2017).

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985): Case Summary

AIR 1986 SC 180; (1985) 3 SCC 545

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) is the case that read the "right to livelihood" into the right to life under Article 21. A five-judge bench unanimously held that you cannot deprive a person of their livelihood except by fair and reasonable procedure. Yet, in a famous paradox, the Court still upheld the Municipality's power to evict the Mumbai pavement dwellers — softening it only with directions for humane treatment.

Case Summary: Joseph Shine v. Union of India 2018

AIR 2018 SC 4898

In Joseph Shine (27 Sep 2018), a five-judge bench led by CJI Dipak Misra unanimously struck down Section 497 IPC and Section 198(2) CrPC, decriminalising adultery. The colonial provision punished only the man, treated the wife as her husband's property and denied women agency — violating equality (Arts 14, 15) and dignity/privacy (Art 21). Four concurring opinions (Misra-Khanwilkar, Nariman, Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra) overruled Yusuf Abdul Aziz (1954), Sowmithri Vishnu (1985) and V. Revathi (1988). Adultery remains a ground for divorce, but it was not re-enacted in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

Case Summary: Shayara Bano v. Union of India 2017

(2017) 9 SCC 1

Five-judge Constitution bench (3:2) declared talaq-e-biddat unconstitutional on 22 August 2017. Nariman & Lalit JJ: manifestly arbitrary under Art 14 (1937 Shariat Act is "law in force" under Art 13). Kurian Joseph J: what is bad in theology cannot be good in law. Khehar CJ & Nazeer J dissented (personal law not subject to Part III). Muslim Women Act 2019 criminalized the practice with up to 3 years imprisonment.

Case Summary: Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala 2018

(2018) 10 SCC 689

Five-judge Constitution bench (28 September 2018) held 4:1 that Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Rules 1965 — which barred women aged 10–50 from Sabarimala — was unconstitutional: not an essential religious practice, and a violation of Arts 14, 15, 17 and 25. CJI Misra + Khanwilkar J. (joint majority); Nariman J. and Chandrachud J. wrote concurring opinions; Malhotra J. dissented. Multiple review petitions were referred to a 9-judge bench in Nov 2019; hearings concluded May 2026, judgment reserved.

Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997): Case Summary

(1997) 6 SCC 241; AIR 1997 SC 3011

Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) is the case that created India's first rules against sexual harassment at work. After social worker Bhanwari Devi was gang-raped for trying to stop a child marriage, women's groups filed a PIL. With no law on the subject, the Supreme Court — drawing on the Constitution and the CEDAW convention — laid down the binding "Vishaka Guidelines", which governed until the POSH Act, 2013 replaced them.

Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981): Case Summary

1981 AIR 1829, (1981) 4 SCC 335, 1982 SCR (1) 438

A three-judge Supreme Court bench struck down two Air India air-hostess service rules — termination on first pregnancy and the Managing Director's unguided discretion over retirement age — as arbitrary and void under Article 14. But it UPHELD the bar on marrying within the first four years of service, and rejected the Article 15/16 sex-discrimination claim, holding that air hostesses and the (all-male) cabin-crew cadre formed separate classes, so the rules were not discrimination on the ground of sex alone.

Mithu v. State of Punjab (1983): Mandatory Death Penalty

1983 AIR 473, (1983) 2 SCC 277

A five-judge Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud struck down Section 303 of the IPC — which made the death penalty the only punishment for a life convict who commits murder — as unconstitutional. By removing all judicial discretion and barring any consideration of mitigating circumstances, the section was arbitrary (Article 14) and imposed an unjust, unfair and unreasonable procedure (Article 21). After Mithu, such murders fall under Section 302, where the death penalty is discretionary and reserved for the "rarest of rare" cases.

Case Summary: Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth

AIR 1977 SC 2328; 1977 SCC (4) 193

Five-judge constitution bench (3:2 majority, 19 Sep 1977) held that "consultation" with the CJI under Art 222 is not a mere formality — the CJI's opinion carries primacy and judicial independence (a basic feature) limits the executive's transfer power. Superseded for appointments by the collegium cases (1993, 1998) but the basic-structure principle remains foundational.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India: A Landmark Case in Indian Constitutional Law

AIR 1978 SC 597

Supreme Court (7-judge bench, 25 Jan 1978) held that "procedure established by law" in Art 21 must be fair, just and reasonable — not arbitrary. Established the Golden Triangle of Arts 14/19/21 as interdependent rights; overruled the watertight-compartments view in A.K. Gopalan (1950). Passport impoundment without a hearing violated Art 21.

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu: Case Summary & Notes

AIR 1974 SC 555; (1974) 4 SCC 3

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1973) is where the Supreme Court first held that arbitrary State action, by itself, violates the right to equality under Article 14 — the "new doctrine of arbitrariness". Ironically, Royappa lost: the Court dismissed his challenge to his transfer, but Justice Bhagwati's reasoning reshaped Indian equality law.

State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) Case Summary

AIR 1952 SC 75

A seven-judge Supreme Court bench, by 6:1 (Patanjali Sastri C.J. dissenting), struck down Section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 as violating Article 14. Letting the government pick individual "cases" for a special court with a truncated procedure — with no guiding policy in the statute — was an arbitrary classification bearing no rational nexus to the Act's stated object of "speedier trial".

S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981): First Judges Case Summary

AIR 1982 SC 149; (1981) Supp SCC 87

S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981), the "First Judges Case", is famous for two very different things. On judicial appointments it held that "consultation" with the Chief Justice does not mean "concurrence", giving the executive the final say — a holding later overruled by the Second Judges Case (1993), which created the collegium. Its enduring legacy is the other half of the judgment: Justice Bhagwati's dramatic relaxation of locus standi, which opened the doors of the courts to public interest litigation (PIL).

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973): Case Summary

(1973) 4 SCC 225

In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), a 13-judge Supreme Court bench held by 7:6 that Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution under Article 368 but cannot destroy its 'basic structure'.

Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani (1978): Right to Silence

AIR 1978 SC 1025, (1978) 2 SCC 424

Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, for a three-judge bench, held that the Article 20(3) guarantee against self-incrimination is not confined to the courtroom — it extends to the police-investigation stage. An accused (here, former Odisha CM Nandini Satpathy) cannot be compelled to answer questions that may expose her to a criminal charge; Section 161(2) CrPC mirrors that right, and the prosecution against her under Section 179 IPC was quashed.

M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak, 1987): Case Summary

(1987) 1 SCC 395; AIR 1987 SC 1086

M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987), the "Oleum Gas Leak" case, is where the Supreme Court created the rule of absolute liability. After oleum gas leaked from Shriram Food and Fertilizers' Delhi plant — just months after the Bhopal disaster — the Court held that an enterprise carrying on a hazardous activity is absolutely liable for any harm if a dangerous substance escapes, with none of the exceptions allowed under the older strict-liability rule, and that compensation must reflect the enterprise's size to deter wrongdoing.

What is Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India? - Study Notes

Study notes on Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India — constitutional basis, key cases, filing procedure, social justice impact, and criticisms.

Article 14 of the Indian Constitution - Explanation & Notes

A clear guide to Article 14 — its two limbs (equality before law and equal protection of laws), the reasonable-classification test, the doctrine of arbitrariness, and the landmark judgments that have shaped the right to equality in India.