Case Summary: Reynolds v. United States
In short
Unanimous US Supreme Court (6 Jan 1879, 98 U.S. 145): the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act does not violate the First Amendment. Religious belief cannot be outlawed; religious practice can be regulated when it conflicts with general laws. CJ Waite drew the foundational belief-action distinction. Reynolds was a deliberate test case organised by Mormon leadership. The doctrine later influenced Sherbert (1963) and Employment Division v Smith (1990).
In this brief
Background and Facts
George Reynolds was a secretary to Brigham Young and a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS / Mormon Church). Polygamy was then a widely practised and officially sanctioned doctrine of the LDS Church, regarded as a divine commandment. Mormon leadership, aware that the 1862 Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act had never been tested, decided to stage a test case — Reynolds agreed to be prosecuted.
Reynolds married a second wife while his first marriage was still subsisting, was indicted for bigamy in the Territory of Utah, convicted, and sentenced to two years' hard labour and a $500 fine. He appealed, arguing that his conviction violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause because polygamy was a religious duty. The Supreme Court accepted the case and delivered its judgment on 6 January 1879.
Issue
Does the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause protect a religious practice — specifically polygamy — such that a federal law criminalising that practice is unconstitutional?
Judgment — Unanimous
Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court, upholding Reynolds' conviction and affirming the constitutionality of the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act.
The Belief-Action Distinction
The Court drew a sharp line between religious belief and religious conduct:
- Belief: Congress cannot enact a law that targets or prohibits what a person believes. The First Amendment fully protects religious opinion and faith.
- Conduct: Congress can regulate actions — even religiously motivated ones — when those actions violate generally applicable criminal laws. To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would be to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself by invoking religious duty: "To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."
Waite CJ cited Thomas Jefferson's 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association (Connecticut) — the famous "wall of separation" letter — as authority for the proposition that the legislature is prohibited from interfering with religion to the extent of making it criminal to hold any religious belief, but is free to reach actions which are in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.
Outcome at a Glance
| Issue | Holding |
|---|---|
| Can the government punish polygamy under a general anti-bigamy law? | Yes — actions (not beliefs) can be regulated |
| Does religious belief provide a defence to criminal charges? | No — religious duty is not a defence |
| Is the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act unconstitutional? | No — upheld as constitutional |
| Vote | Unanimous (9:0); no dissent |
Legacy and Later Cases
The belief-action distinction from Reynolds remained the cornerstone of US Free Exercise jurisprudence for decades. Later cases modified its scope:
- Sherbert v. Verner (1963): The Court added a balancing test — if a law substantially burdens a religious practice, the government must show a compelling interest. This partially softened Reynolds.
- Employment Division v. Smith (1990): The Court largely reverted to Reynolds: a neutral, generally applicable law does not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if it incidentally burdens religious practice. Sherbert's balancing test was confined to unemployment benefit cases.
- Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 1993: Congress responded to Smith by requiring courts to apply the compelling interest / least restrictive means test — restoring much of Sherbert's protection by statute.
India: The Essential Practices Parallel
Indian constitutional law addresses the same tension through the essential religious practices doctrine under Articles 25 and 26. While the US approach asks whether a law is neutral and generally applicable, India's Supreme Court asks whether the impugned practice is an "essential" part of the religion. If it is not, Article 25 does not protect it. Cases like Shirur Mutt (1954), Shayara Bano (2017), and the pending Sabarimala 9-judge bench reference all grapple with the same underlying question Reynolds posed in 1879: when can the state override a religiously motivated practice?